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I. INTRODUCTION
In the frenzied days and weeks following September 11th many observers called for
serious consideration of a national identity system whose centerpiece would be some form of
national identity card. Such a system was seen mainly as a tool against terrorists, but also as a
useful response to illegal immigration, identity theft, and electoral fraud. As yet, no member of
Congress has introduced legislation to establish a formal national identity system or require a
national identity card,1 and the “war on terrorism” has turned to other concerns. Nevertheless,
the past two years have seen the most serious and detailed consideration of a national identity

1

Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “National ID Card Proposals by Another Name” “Does America Need a National
Identifier?” at 114, 118
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system in a generation,2 and we are probably just one domestic terror attack away from its
implementation in some form.3
A national identity system raises a host of policy and legal issues. Among the former, the
most important issue is what the purpose of such a system would be and whether it would be
worth the inevitable financial and social costs. The answer to that question would help
determine such subsidiary questions as who would be required to carry an identity card, what
data would be linked to the card, who would have access to that data, and what uses would be
made of it. There are many possible “national identity systems” and myriad kinds and uses of a
national identity card.
Scholarly and popular commentary on the possibility of national identity cards has tended
to focus on their effect on individual privacy, or, as some have put it, the right to anonymity.
Obviously, this is an extremely important issue, because a national identity card has the potential
to alter some fundamental aspects of American life. It would undoubtedly enhance governmental
access to information about each person’s activities, interests, and contacts. Imposing identity
checks would in all likelihood vastly increase the frequency of interactions with government
agents. Although the possible Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications of a national identity
system have often been acknowledged, they have not been explored in any great depth.4 While
the impact on these constitutional rights would of course depend on the particular features of the

2

See e.g. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTAND THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE
CHALLENGE 200-201 (2002) (a national identity card is “an issue that deserves careful consideration”); The Century
Foundation Homeland Security Project, The Debate Over a National Identification Card 1 (2003) (“[P]roposals for
creating a national identification card have gained new attention.”). See also, id. at 8-9 (listing proposals for
enhancements to identity documents and identification requirements).
3
The Century Foundation Homeland Security Project, The Debate Over a National Identification Card 10
(2003)(“[I]t is likely that some sort of more extensive identification system will eventually be established in the
United States”).
4
Computer Science and Telecommunications, National Research Council, IDs – Not That Easy 7 (200!) (“Clearly,
an examination of the legal . . . framework surround identity systems . . . would be essential.”)
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system, because of their centrality to any likely national identity system it is worth examining
these issues even in the absence of a concrete proposal.5
Part II of this Article describes the features of a national identity system which most
observers regard as essential. The main point of identity checking is to make a connection
between the identified individual and a collection of data. To be effective, a national identity
system would therefore need to insist that people provide identification at certain times or places.
This would almost certainly produce new interactions between the populace and law
enforcement personnel – a subject regulated by the Fourth Amendment only when it amounts to
a seizure of the person. One Fourth Amendment question, then, concerns the occasions on which
state agents could demand to see a person’s identity card. As the law stands now, the police may
request to see identification of anyone at any time, in a so-called consensual encounter that does
not involve seizure of the individual. On the other hand, the demand to see identification usually
turns the encounter into an investigative detention, which generally requires that the police have
reasonable suspicion of criminality. In addition, however, the Supreme Court has approved the
use of suspicionless identification checkpoint stops for certain purposes like border control.
The creation of a duty to carry and present identification at certain times would
presumably take place against this background, while moving some of these doctrines into new
territory. Could, for example, every person subjected to an investigative stop be compelled, on
pain of prosecution, to show identification? If so, would a national identity system create an
incentive to make more stops, particularly for moving violations. When could compulsory
identity checkpoints be sustained under the Fourth Amendment administrative search rationale?

5

NRC Report, supra note 4, at 29 (“The constitutional limitations on an agent’s ability to require presentation of IDs
. . . should be explored before any such enactment to avert the costs of imposing the system and then having to
revise or abandon it in the face of its unconstitutionality, to say nothing of its effects on civil liberties.”
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Moreover, would there be Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections to any of these
identification requirements? Part III addresses the constitutional questions raised by
governmental demands, in a number of contexts, that a person present her identity card.
An identity check can generate new data as well as draw on existing databases. The
Fourth and Fifth Amendments are also potentially implicated by the surveillance and monitoring
of a person’s movement and activities through such data collection and retention. This is
particularly true of governmental collection of data generated in circumstances in which there
might otherwise be some legitimate expectation of privacy, such as information provided to
health care or educational institutions or in other registration procedures. Would this be a search
under the Fourth Amendment and, if so, would it be a reasonable one. As to more public
encounters, law enforcement personnel may generally observe a person while she is in a public
place, and may even use common technological aids to do so. So some data collection attendant
on identity checks would seem exempt from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Would the national
identity system’s frequent and thorough monitoring of movement and activities be so unlike
more common police surveillance, though, that it constitutes a search and is therefore regulated
by the Fourth Amendment? If so, at the very least it could not be done as a matter of course. A
potential source of compelled self-incrimination inheres in this data generating aspect of a
national identity system: the requirement that certain self-reported information be conveyed to
official databanks. Part IV explores the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised in the
potential data collection and retention features of a national identity system.
This Article is not concerned with the efficacy of a national identification system or
whether its benefits, however measured, would outweigh its costs – in other words, whether it is
a “good idea.” The findings of this Article are not completely divorced from that question,
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however. As this Article will demonstrate, to some degree the Fourth Amendment will reduce
the potential benefits of a national identification system by standing in the way of practices that
system might otherwise employ. In particular, random identification stops would fly in the face
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “Terrorist” profiling checkpoints probably do not pass
Fourth Amendment muster, either, though they might in certain circumstances. Identification
demands in the course of registration procedures, traffic or investigative stops, or arrests,
however, are all acceptable. Nor does the Fourth Amendment stand in the way of requesting –
rather than demanding -- identification of any person at any time. On the information gathering
side of the process, there are substantial Fourth Amendment questions raised by mandated
reporting of personal information that people produce in the course of everyday life. Though this
practice should be regarded as a search, it may not be an unreasonable one, up to a point. In
contrast to the substantial questions that arise under Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
presents little serious obstacle to the most probable national identity system practices.
Whether all of this leaves the glass of a national identity card half full or half empty
depends on one’s perspective. What is fairly clear is that while the constitution might bar certain
practices, and block others depending on their purpose, it would be possible to have a
constitutional national identity card system of a fairly comprehensive type. Even where such an
identity system would not strictly run afoul of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, an analysis of
the interests those provisions are designed to protect provides an insight into the price in privacy
and liberty a national identity card would exact. This Article will also indicate how these effects
might be somewhat mitigated in the system’s design. In that sense, this Article hopes to
illuminate not only what kind of national identity system the U.S. lawfully could have, but how it
might be designed, and, implicitly, whether we want to have one at all.
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II. FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY SYSTEM
A. Generally
The basic function of a national identity system would be “to link a stream of data with a
person.”6 “[H]uman identification is the association of data with a particular human being.”7
Once that connection is made, official reaction can take a variety of forms, depending of course
on what the data show and the legal consequences of that knowledge. Our current database of
outstanding arrest warrants,8 for example, authorizes the arrest of the individual linked with such
information.9 In protecting against terrorists, in general once the link between an individual and
a certain record was established, the aim would be that “[i]f there were risk factors, the
appropriate measure could be taken to ensure safety.”10 In a similar way, the association
between a given person and a body of data can be used for purposes other than crime prevention
and enforcement. A national identity system, it has been suggested, can “aid in fraud prevention
(for example, in the administration of public benefits), catch ‘deadbeat dads,’ enable electoral
reforms, allow quick background checks for those buying guns or other monitored items, and
prevent illegal aliens from working in the United States.”11
Any such system depends on two major features: the database (or databases) containing
information about particular individuals and a means to connect a given person with that

6

Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,”
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 8 (1994).
7
Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,”
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 8 (1994).
8
Cite needed
9
See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to a search resulting
from the arrest of a suspect erroneously listed in a database as having an outstanding arrest warrant).
10
Sobel, Demeaning, at 334. See also, statement of Tim Hoescht, Oracle, , “Does America Need a National
Identifier?” at 140, 141-42.
11
NRC, supra note 1, at 6.
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information.12 One way to store information about a person is on a card or other physical token
in human readable or machine-readable form.13 Alternatively, information may be stored in
computer databases elsewhere, in which case there will likely be points in time at which
information about the individual would be accessed, or input, or both. “[A] card would likely be
one component of a large and complex nationwide identity system, the core of which could be a
database of personal information on the U.S. population.”14 What data to collect, who would
have access to that data, and what uses would be made of it are major issues in the design of any
prospective national identity system.15 As is discussed below, these decisions will directly
affect the degree to which the system creates searches or seizures in the Fourth Amendment
sense.
In addition to this information cache, any national identity system must have a means of
establishing identity, in the sense of recognizing an individual as being a specified person.
Roger Clarke has produced a thorough review of the various means of identifying a person in
order to associate data with that person. These include appearance, social behavior, names,

12

This is no easy task. For an indication of some of how much work would need to be done to construct a standard
national database, see Government Accounting Office, Terrorist Watch Lists Should be Consolidated to Promote
Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322 (April 15, 2003) at 1-2 (“Generally, the federal government’s
approach to developing and using terrorist and criminal watch lists in performing its border security mission is
diffuse and nonstandard, largely because these lists were developed and have evolved in response to individual
agencies’ unique mission needs and the agencies’ respective legal, cultural, and technological environments.”);
Government Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa
Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (June 2003). In September 2003 the federal government established a new
Terrorist Screening Center, to consolidate terrorist watchlists and used the results in screening by consuls, border
agents, and other federal officials, as well as some private industries. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/Hspd-6 (September 16, 2003) reprinted in 80 Interpreter Releases 1322 (September 22, 2003); Dan Eggen,
Plan for Counterterror Database Unveiled, WASH POST A02 (September 17, 2003).
13
NRC, supra note 1, at 22.
14
NRC at 5.
15
See NRC, supra note 1, at 22-28.
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codes, knowledge, tokens, bio-dynamics, natural physiology, and imposed physical
characteristics.16
In any potential national identity system codes, tokens, and physiology – or some
combination of all three – will likely be the most important means of identification. Codes are
usually a set of numbers, such as the Social Security number. Their major advantages over
names are that they are unique, they do not change, and their issuance can be controlled.17 A
“token” is a tangible item that a person has in his or her possession. These are often documents,
though they do not have to be; “memory” or “smart” cards with encoded data can also serve as
identity tokens. Documentary tokens currently in common use include birth certificates,
passports, drivers’ licenses, and social security cards.18
Biometrics are identification techniques based on some unique physiological and
difficult-to-alienate characteristic.19 Current forms of identification often rely on such relatively
primitive biometrics as skin, hair, and eye color, physical markings, gender, and facial hair.

16

Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues, 7
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PEOPLE, No. 4, 6, 10 (1994). Clarke gives an interesting account and capsule
history of each. He also gives the following shorthand summary:
1.

appearance – or how the person looks;

2.

social behaviour – or how the person interacts with others;

3.

names – or what the person is called by other people;

4.

codes – or what the person is called by an organization;

5.

knowledge – or what the person knows;

6.

tokens – or what the person has;

7.

bio-dynamics – or what the person does;

8.

natural physiography – or what the person is;

9.

imposed physical characteristics – or what the person is now.

17

Clarke, supra note 16, at 13.
For a detailed specification of documents establishing employment authorization and identity for purposes of
verifying authorization to work in the U.S., see Immigration and Nationality Act §274A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A.
§1324a(b)(1) (identity established by U.S. passport, resident alien card, driver’s license).
19
Clarke, supra note 16, at 17.
18
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These are often portrayed in a photograph or list of physical characteristics, as, for example, on a
driver’s license. More discriminating physiological features that can also be used to establish
identity include fingerprints, DNA patterns, and iris patterns.20 Such biometrics serve to link the
token on which the biometric information is contained to the person to whom it is supposed to
relate.21 Biometrics can also be associated directly from the person to the identification, as with
computerized face recognition or iris scans.22
Codes and biometrics can be combined on a token, and present-day engineering can make
this token hard to duplicate. The National Research Council Committee on Authentication
Technologies and Their Privacy Implications has sketched out one example.23 Another proposal
made, and retracted, recently includes an enhanced and standardized state drivers license.24 It
must be recognized, however, that “the best that any system of authentication can do is provide a

20

Clarke, supra note 16, at 19.
Clarke, supra note 16, at 17.
22
Cite needed
23
NRC, supra note 1, at 38-39:
21

Another possibility is a memory card (or storage card), which would hold more information and be more
expensive than the magnetic-stripe cards of the previous example. These cards contain memory as well as some
security logic to prevent unauthorized reading or tampering with their data. The information contained on them
could be digitally signed (that is, a number would be associated with that information that is dependent on a secret
known only to the signer as well as on the data itself) to prevent easy counterfeiting. The correspondence between
the user and the card (along with the information on the card and in the database) could be ascertained through
biometric authentication, which would be undertaken using special equipment – such as a reader for fingerprints or
iris scans – in addition to presentation of the card. An additional possibility is to use smart card technology that
permits computation (such as digital signatures and encryption) to take place on the card itself.
Though successful attacks have taken place, these cards are even harder to counterfeit than memory cards.
They might have a name, photo, number, and biometric data, all of which could be cryptographically signed. The
data would be backed up in a database to enable checking when reissuing a card and checking for duplicates when
the card is first issued. A card of this sort could engage in a real-time, cryptographic exchange with an online
system to verify a user’s identity – possibly without exposing details of that identity to the organization performing
the data capture – for example, an airline or a retail establishment.
24

See, Sobel, supra note 10, at 336-37 (The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators called for
linking driers’ license records with Social Security, immigration, and law enforcement databases.) See also, Richard
Edwardson, National Identification Systems and Privacy Right, UCLA J. OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 4 (2002).
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compelling connection with some previous verification of identity.”25 In other words, identity
documents or other tokens are only as good as the “breeder” documents that produced them;
“[t]he accuracy of each layer of identification depends on the accuracy of the preceding
layers.”26 While this may mean that no identification system can ensure completely that a given
individual is who she claims to be, this problem goes more to the efficacy of a national identity
system than to any question of legality.
This capsule summary of the functions and broad features of a national identity system
may sound familiar to anyone living in early 21st century America because identification linked
to information is already part of daily life. Some would conclude that we already have a national
identity system, based primarily on the social security number.27 Richard Sobel, for example,
contends that even prior to September 11th a national identity system “was developing from the
combination of government databanks and ID requirements,” due to several pieces of federal
legislation that combine a demand for identification with computerized records.28 Other
proposed legislation would move the U.S. in the direction of a national identity system, without

25

NRC, supra note 1, at.
Lynn M. Lopucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX.L.REV. 89, 98 (2001);
U.S. General Accounting Office Testimony of Robert J. Cramer, Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud
Raise Security Concerns (Sept. 9, 2003) (Senate Committee on Finance) ( government officials generally did not
recognize counterfeit documents in General Accounting Office attempts to obtain genuine driver’s licenses).
27
See e.g., Rick S. Lear & Jefferson D. Reynolds, Your Social Security Number or Your Life: Disclosure of
Personal Identification Information by Military Personnel and the Compromise of Privacy and National Security, 21
B. U. INTL. L. J 1, 13-14 (2003).
28
Sobel, supra note 10, at 323-32 (The five basic parts of an incipient national identification system are the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) hereinafter IRCA; the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (“IIRIRA”); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724 (1996) hereinafter IIRIRA; the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“Welfare Reform Act”); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) hereinafter Welfare Reform Act; the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) hereinafter HIPPA; and the Federal Aviation Administration ID
requirement and Computer Assisted Passenger Screening system (“CAPS”); Id at 323. Sobel also mentions
educational databanks. Id. at n. 13. A social security number is used by the military, appears on military identity
cards, and must be given to captors by service members. Lear & Reynolds, supra note 27, at 4-8.
26
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formally establishing one.29 One object of a true national identity system would be to allow
access to information contained in several unrelated databases through one centralized system.30
B. Demands for Identification
Any system that depends on linking an individual with a certain identity, and hence to a
body of data, must require that the person identify herself at some point or points in time,
whether that identification is made by way of codes, tokens, biometrics, or some other means.31
In theory, participation in an identification system can be voluntary or mandatory. An example
of a “voluntary” program is the proposal for a “trusted traveler” card, which would exempt
airline passengers from certain pre-flight inspections.32 While possession and use of such a card
would be voluntary,33 the need to present it to gain the benefits of the program would not.
Virtually any true national identity system requires mandatory participation, both in the sense of
having an identity within the system and in presenting identification when required.34 This is
certainly true for a system whose object was discovery of undocumented migrants; some means
of proof of lawful presence in the U.S. would seem to be a sine qua non of its operation.

29

Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 123 “National ID Card Proposals by
Another Name” (“No member of Congress has introduced legislation that would implement a national ID system or
ID card. Instead there are several proposals that would establish a national ID card or system through the
‘backdoor’ of other proposed legislation.”) See sources supra note 2.
30
Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 120
31
See TAN 16
32
See e.g. David Jones, What’s Your “Risk Score”?, In These Times (June 23 2003), at 17 (A trusted traveler
program “would allow travelers to speed through airport security if they voluntarily agree to undergo an extensive
background check and carried a card with a digital fingerprint or other biometric identifier.” Alan M. Dershowitz,
Why Fear National ID Cards?, NY TIMES OCT. 13, 2001, at A23 (optional identity card would be allowed to pass
through security “more expeditiously”). See also, Sarah D. Scalet, Who Do You Trust?, CIO Magazine (referring to
a trusted traveler program as the “post-9/11 version of first class”).
33
Cf., NRC, supra note 1, at 28 (“[E]ven when a system is nominally voluntary, attention should be paid to whether
the large inconveniences of nonparticipation make it effectively mandatory.”)
34
NRC, supra note 1, at 28.
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Realistically, demands for presentation of identification are inherent in any national identity
system that would be worth having. 35
Observers fear, however, that these “identification encounters” will have several
inevitable effects. First, people would be required to carry the identification card or other token,
and present it at designated interactions.36 Second, at least some of these encounters would
entail involuntary stops to present the identity token, and would thus interfere with free
movement, as well as imposing dignitary harms. “Day-to-day individuals could be asked for ID
when they are walking down the street, applying for a job or health insurance or entering a
building.”37

There is also some fear that these identification checks would be

disproportionately directed at members of minority groups.38
None of these apprehensions is without precedent. Even today, Belgium has a
comprehensive national identity system and police officers can ask to see the identity card of any
person found in public.39 When the British used identity cards for commodity rationing during
and after World War II, police demanded to see the cards at other times, leading to protests and
ultimately the end of the program in 1952.40 Identity cards were essential to South Africa’s
apartheid system. They also proved very helpful to Nazi and Rwandan genocidal killers, who
used them to identity and locate members of their target ethnic groups.41

35

NRC, supra note 1, at 28 (“In general, any attempt to ascertain that an individual does not possess an unwanted
attribute (for example, malicious intent) requires a complete knowledge of behaviors related to that attribute, and
hence mandatory checks.”)
36
Sobel, supra note 10. at 338-39, 363.
37
Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 113
38
Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 114, 118
39
Testimony of Rudi Veestraeten, Identity Cards and National Register in
Belgium, in “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 129, 131 (“Although such request on behalf of a
law enforcement agency does not need to be [so] motivated, it mostly occurs only when there is a particular reason
for a police officer to so do (suspicious behavior, events, security reasons).” Id. at 131.
40
Sobel, supra note 10, at 347.
41
Sobel, supra note 10, at 343-49.
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In addition to the burdens of carrying identification and producing it on demand, required
presentation of identity tokens might have other effects on individuals’ freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure. One is the monitoring of individual movement and activity.
Each identification encounter would be an occasion to add information to the central database,
facilitating government surveillance of movement and activity.42 In any high-integrity identifier
scheme, it is feared by some, “[a]ll human behaviour would become transparent to the state and
the scope for non-conformism and dissent would be muted to the point envisaged by the antiUtopian novelists.”43
Conversely, each identification encounter would contain the potential for the resulting
information, rightly or wrongly, to cause a further interference with personal mobility. This
effect depends, of course, on what the information is and how it is used. Historically, some
identity cards have served in effect as internal passports. “Under the most repressive regimes,
such as those in Communist Eastern Europe, inhabitant registration schemes were instrumental
in the prevention of unauthorized movement both within the country and out of it.”44
The Transportation Security Administration (and its forerunner) has had a computerbased airline passenger screening in place since the late 1990’s, and is currently testing an
updated version called CAPPS II.45 The CAPPS II system collects passengers’ personal
information such as name, address, birth date and credit card number. It then checks this
information against databases, including criminal history records, to produce a passenger

42

Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 113
Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,”
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 34 (1994).
44
Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy
Issues,” 7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 27 (1994). This was also true in a more rudimentary form
for slaves in the antebellum South. Sobel, supra note 10, at 343.
45
Joe Sharkey, A Safer Sky or Welcome to Flight 1984?, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003, at C9.
43
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security code of green, yellow, or red.46 According to the Transportation Safety Administration,
this will “allow dynamic targeting on a real-time basis.”47 Those passengers receiving a rating of
red will be denied boarding, something that has happened under the existing CAPPS system.48
In sum, it is almost inevitable that any national identity system, whether total or partial,
will require individuals to present identification at certain times and places because “[t]he
absence of the power to demand evidence of identity weakens the integrity of a general-purpose
identification scheme.”49 Just what occasions would require an identification check is an
important issue in the system design. At present, individuals must provide specified forms of
identification to prove employment authorization at the time of hire,50 to obtain a passport,51 or
to board an airplane.52 The provision of a social security number (often without actual production
of the card) attends other transactions.53 Increased demands for identification, probably through
presentation of a token or some other identification mechanism, are almost inevitable if a

46

Joe Sharkey, A Safer Sky or Welcome to Flight 1984?, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003, at C9. See also, Matthew L.
Wald, U.S. Agency Scales Back Data Required On Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A16 (Transportation
Safety Administration “will not use information of a passenger’s credit, like a returned check or an unpaid bill, nor
any health records.”) Larry Abramson, Plans to step up security screening for airline passengers have been
derailed, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, August 1, 2003 (Lexis).
47
Wald, supra note 46 (“The risk assessment function . . . will determine the likelihood that a passenger is a known
terrorist , or has identifiable links to known terrorists.”) There are also plans eventually to identify people for whom
there are warrants for violent crimes. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Critics Wary of New Traveler Profile System, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (August 26, 2003).
48
Jones, supra note 32
49
Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy
Issues,” 7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 27 (1994).
50
See supra note 18.
51

U.S. Dept. of State, How to Apply for in Person for a U.S. Passport,
http://travel.state.gov/passport_obtain_text.html (visited September 29, 2003) (previous U.S.
passport; naturalization certificate; certificate of citizenship; or current, valid driver's license or
government or military identification; plus a social security number).
52

Sobel, supra note 10, at 325. (Since October 1995, the Federal aviation Administration (“FAA”) has required
airlines to ask passengers to identify themselves with government-issued identification.”)
53
Sobel, supra note 10, at 324-27.
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national identity system is established. Moreover, once the system was in place the tendency
would be to use it, and over time to expand its use.54
III. IDENTITY CARD REQUESTS AND DEMANDS
The Fourth Amendment bars “unreasonable seizures,” including seizures of the person.
Evaluating the effect of the Fourth Amendment on demands for identification involves
determining first whether the demand is a “seizure;” if not, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is at
an end. If the encounter does entail a “seizure” the second question is whether it is one that is
“reasonable.” All manner of state-citizen interactions are potentially implicated by identity card
checking, and the Fourth Amendment analysis will be similarly varied. This Part proceeds by
both applying existing Fourth Amendment principles to the kinds of situations in which a
national identity card would likely be requested or demanded and evaluating what effects a
widespread national identity system would have on the law itself.
A. Consensual Interactions
Not every demand for identification involves a “seizure.” For reasons of her own, an
individual may choose to interact with a state agent requesting her identification, and the
additional action of producing identification will usually not convert the voluntary encounter to a
seizure. There are however, degrees of voluntariness. Moreover, an intrusive national identity
system would, itself, probably affect how people perceive identity checks, and how they react to
them.
At present one occasion for mandatory identification occurs when individuals must give
identification information over the phone, over the internet, or by mail. This is usually some
54

Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,”
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 27 (1994). (“It is only to be expected that various pressure groups
will seek to increase the impositions as time goes by, in response to such problems as illegal immigration, perceived
worsening of law and order, epidemics, natural disasters, national security emergencies, etc.”). In addition, there is
the real possibility of abuse of whatever system results. See TAN infra.
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combination of name, code (e.g., social security or credit card number), and knowledge-based
identifier (e.g. PIN, mother’s maiden name).55 Nothing even remotely approaching a seizure is
involved in this kind of exchange because there is no personal restraint.
At the level of personal interaction, identification is currently required during what may
be described as registration procedures. These include registration for drivers’ licenses, medical
services, schools, and flights, as well as employment eligibility verification. Airport check-in is
the paradigm, and now necessitates government-issued photo identification.56 All of these tasks
may require the customer to “stop” to register, and while the display of identification tokens may
slightly lengthen the process, it is unlikely that those additional moments would convert it to a
state-mandated seizure.
The Supreme Court has refused to find a seizure in governmental questioning and
identification requests of people already in confining circumstances. In INS v. Delgado, for
example, immigration agents moved through a factory, questioning workers and then asking for
immigration papers from those who appeared not to be citizens.57 These requests for
identification were held not to be seizures, because, in the Court’s view, the workers had no
reasonable fear that they could not continue working or moving about the factory.58 INS agents
also took positions near the factory exits. The Court rejected the claim that the entire workforce
was therefore seized because “[o]rdinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about
has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the
workers’ voluntary obligations to their employers.”59 The Court has followed this approach in
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See supra note 16.
See supra note 52.
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466 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1984).
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Id. at 220-21.
59
Id. at 218.
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two cases upholding police requests for permission to search the luggage or persons of interstate
bus travelers, finding that although the passengers’ freedom of movement had been limited the
restriction flowed not from police conduct but from being passengers on a bus.60 This reasoning
easily applies to identification requests that are ancillary to other required interactions, such as
the registration procedures described above, and strongly suggests that a national identity system
could mandate the display of identification at other registration points, such as hotel or car rental
check-ins, without creating any “seizure” of the person, so long as the registration would, by
itself, ordinarily restrict movement.
Moreover, similar reasoning allows law enforcement agents to approach people and ask
for identification even when their freedom of movement is not already limited by their own
actions or decisions; in other words, as they go about their business in public. As long as a
reasonable person would feel free to “terminate the encounter” in the circumstances, then the
person has not been seized;61 instead, she is participating in what the Court has called a
“consensual encounter.”62 A request for identification documents falls within the scope of a
consensual encounter.63 The Court has recently stated, “Even when law enforcement officers
have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions [and] ask for
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Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); see also United States. v. Drayton, 536 U.S.194, 201-02 ((2002).
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2002 SUPREME COURT REV. 153, 164-206 (2002); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure
and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 135-141 (2003); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between
Freedom and Restraint: the Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 521-35 (2001).
63
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980). If the individual declines to answer questions or requests
for identification, “and the police take additional steps . . . to obtain an answer,” however, then a detention has
occurred. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217.
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identification . . . provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means,”64 a holding that
reiterates statements in earlier cases. 65
This doctrine has important implications for any national identity system. Law
enforcement agents could approach individuals on the street and request to see a national identity
card at any time, without any prior suspicion of criminality or other illegality. In a sense, an
American national identity system could resemble the present Belgian one66 as long as the
interactions were requests and not commands. Simple requests for identification would probably
produce compliance in the large majority of cases.67 This raises, however, one of the dangers of
law enforcement use of consensual encounters. Because the Fourth Amendment does not govern
them, they can be initiated for no reason or for any reason at all, including the “racial
stereotyping that is, unfortunately prevalent in every area of unregulated police discretion.”68 As
a means of identity checking, then, consensual encounters run the risk of being employed on the
basis of apparent race, ethnicity, or national origin, or appearing to be. In fact, since September
11, the debate on profiling understandably has shifted to role of racial, ethnic, national, religious
profiling in preventing terrorism. Given that this would presumably be the principal goal of any
national identity system, the role of profiles could easily figure in its design and use. Airline
checking and immigration enforcement, to name two contexts, have already been criticized for
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United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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the use of ethnic and national criteria,69 but some have contended that this is a rational response
to the current terrorism threat.70 Because the constitution puts so little restraint on racial,
national, and ethnic profiling in areas such as consensual encounters, it is especially important
that the issue be addressed in the drafting of any such system.
In a true consensual encounter, no person could be compelled to produce her identity
card, however. After all, the whole premise of a consensual encounter is voluntariness on the
part of the citizen, so individuals have a perfect right to say no.71 While consensual encounters
are not at all uncommon as an investigative technique, particularly for drug interdiction,72 they
are not currently imposed on large segments of the U.S. population, as would be the case if they
became an integral part of identity-checking. If a true cross-section of the American population
were routinely asked to show their identity cards by government agents, the incidence of
compliance might decline drastically.73 A national identity system that depended on voluntary
responses to requests for identification thus runs the risk of perfectly legal, and possible
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See e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1576-86 (2002) (describing the
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organized, civil disobedience.74 It is unlikely, therefore, that a national identity system could
rely solely, or mainly, on consensual compliance as a means of identity verification.
B. Investigative Stops
In contrast to a consensual encounter, the compelled detention of a person for
investigation, including a demand for identification, constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Though the real life factual differences between them can be quite small, an
investigative stop is thus conceptually quite different from a consensual encounter. Under Terry
v. Ohio75and its numerous Supreme Court progeny,76 such seizures can be conducted only on
“specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”77 These facts and inferences can relate to an ongoing crime
or a past felony. The level of evidence need for a lawful stop is often called “reasonable” or
“articulable” suspicion, and can be distinguished from “inarticulable hunches”78 or “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion,”79 which are not sufficient to compel a person to halt for
investigation.
Therefore, persons could not involuntarily be seized on a random or individual basis for
identity checks in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court so held in Brown v.
Texas, in which an officer stopped Brown for the sole reason of discovering his identity.80
Because the officer lacked any basis for believing Brown to be involved in criminal activity, the
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seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.81 The Supreme Court similarly has barred the
suspicionless stopping of motor vehicles to check license and registration82 or for questioning
about the travelers’ citizenship.83 These cases obviously constitute an obstacle to the
effectiveness of any national identity system that depends on more than spot checking of the
already suspicious, though, as we shall see below, not necessarily an insurmountable one.84
In those cases where reasonable suspicion to stop a person is present, mandatory
possession of an identity card or other identity token would greatly enhance the utility of the
investigative stop – as well as the possibility of abuse. As things stand now, the officer may
demand identification and may even in some cases search for it,85 but without a statute
criminalizing noncompliance,86 the officer has no way of securing it. Even then, addressing a
statute requiring “’credible and reliable’” identification that carries a ‘reasonable assurance’ of
its authenticity,” Kolender v. Lawson, the Court found the law void for vagueness.87 In the
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Court’s opinion, this standard gave excessive discretion to the police, opening the possibility of
discriminatory enforcement.88
The vagueness problem in Kolender could presumably be remedied by a careful
specification of just what kind of identity documentation the law requires.89 A standard and
relatively secure identity token would seem to be an essential feature of any national identity
system,90 and it would be surprising if such an identity card did not satisfy the vagueness
objections voiced in Kolender. In other words, the specification of a national identity card as
adequate (or necessary) proof of identity would remove uncertainty about what constitutes
proper identification.
That would still leave two issues not decided by the Supreme Court in Kolender: whether
either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments stand in the way of requiring that someone stopped on
reasonable suspicion identify herself.91 The Fourth Amendment argument, as made by Justice
Brennan in two nonmajority opinions, seems to be that because it is conducted on less than
probable cause, a Terry stop assumes a relatively low level of intrusion on personal privacy and
mobility.92 A demand for identification infringes on the right of a person stopped on reasonable
suspicion to refuse to answer police questions,93 and, overall, imposes on the suspect more than
the seizure alone, and, overall, more than reasonable suspicion can justify. The Ninth Circuit has
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accepted these arguments and found criminal punishment for refusal to give identification during
a Terry stop to violate the Fourth Amendment, at least where identification is not needed as part
of the investigation.94 Most other courts, on the other hand, have upheld arrest and conviction
for obstructing police business or for violation of statutes specifically requiring a suspect to give
identification on request.95
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the purpose of an investigative stop is to
confirm or dispel the suspicion that caused it.96 The officers may use reasonable means to do so,
including briefly detaining, demanding identification, and directing questions to the person. If
everyone was compelled to carry an identity card pursuant to a previously enacted national
identity system, would it be “reasonable” to demand to see that identification of those persons
stopped on reasonable suspicion? The answer probably depends on two issues: 1) whether
official knowledge of the person’s identity (and associated data) would assist in the investigation,
and 2) how long, or otherwise inconvenient, that process would be.
On the first issue, once the police have articulable suspicion that a person is committing
or planning a crime, there is a reasonable likelihood that an identity check, especially one that
tapped into criminal history and law enforcement databases, would produce useful information.
For example, if the reasonable suspicion concerned drug sale or possession, access to a criminal
history for that or related crimes would at least intensify the investigation. Similarly, data might
confirm a suspect’s story – that, for example, she works in an isolated area -- and thus dispel
suspicion. There are myriad ways in which access to the suspects’ identity would further the
investigation. Probably the most significant effect of database-linked identity checks would be
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the discovery of outstanding warrants, which themselves would provide a basis for the suspects’s
arrest.97 In short, a national identity card would make investigative stops more efficient and
effective.
It is hard to see how these uses would materially increase the intrusiveness of the stop
itself. While there would also be some circumstances in which requiring the suspect’s identity
card would not advance the investigation, merely asking for or reading it does not seem to add
appreciably to the stop’s intrusiveness. Moreover, it would be silly and unworkable to ask the
officer on the street to distinguish between stops where identification would help and those
where it would not. Rather, this would seem an area where a “bright-line” rule would make
good sense.98
On the other hand, if the suspect was detained for an appreciable period of additional
time, moved, or placed in a more confined area in connection with the identity check, then the
process might be more intrusive than a Terry stop allows.99 This could happen, for example, if
the identity information had to be transmitted to a database and a reply took a long time to arrive.
While in theory this could be accomplished in the time it takes to authorize a credit card
transaction, a glitch in database access or communication is certainly possible. It is debatable
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whether a prolonged detention pending the outcome of a database search would be a
“reasonable” incident of an investigative stop.100
The last objection to requiring an identification token on pain of criminal prosecution is
that if the police may arrest a person for failing to identify herself during a Terry stop, then
identification statutes “bootstrap the authority to arrest on less than probable cause.”101 There is
very little to this argument. If the state can legitimately require people to carry identity cards and
they fail to produce them at statutorily specified moments, then there is now probable cause to
arrest for that crime even if probable cause to arrest for the circumstances that produced the stop
never developed. Perhaps the fear is that the police would demand identification only, or mainly,
from those whom they wanted to arrest for the underlying offense, but could not. If a national
identity system was in existence, this tactic might actually succeed in producing an arrest for
failure or refusal lessfrequently, because more people would be able easily to supply
identification. In any event, it is hard to see how the possibility that an otherwise lawful stop
might lead to an arrest for an unrelated crime somehow makes the stop itself, based upon
independent grounds, questionable under the Fourth Amendment.102
Nor does the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, by itself or in conjunction with
the Fourth Amendment, bar officers from demanding identity cards from those stopped on
reasonable suspicion. Ordinary questioning of a suspect during an investigative stop has been
held not to bear the kind of psychological “compulsion” to self-incriminate that would trigger
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Miranda warnings.103 A demand for identification, however, does involve compulsion, because
a refusal -- often now, and certainly under a national identity system -- would likely involve
some criminal penalty.104 A suspect would thus face the choice between complying with a
directive to produce her identity card or face arrest and prosecution. Thus, though Miranda
warnings presumably do not have to be given, other core Fifth Amendment issues are potentially
involved in demands for identification.
Assuming it is compelled, is a response to an identification demand also testimonial?
The individual is saying “XY is my name,” or “ABC is my address.” The suspect is being
“asked for a response requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or
belief,” and the answer therefore contains a testimonial component.105 Because a false answer
could also result in criminal penalty,106 and a truthful answer could sometimes serve to
incriminate, the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or punishment could potentially be
present.107 Similarly, someone who hands over an identity card is implicitly stating, “The
information on this card pertains to me.” The communication implicit in that act of production
makes testimonial a response to a command to supply identification.108
For Miranda purposes, at least, even where there is compelled testimony, questions
“normally attendant to arrest and custody”109 are exempt from the usual interrogation rules.
Eight Justices have concluded that responses to these “booking questions,” designed to obtain
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biographical data for police administrative purposes, are an exception to the Miranda rules.110 It
would not be surprising for the Court to extend this administrative question exception to “core”
Fifth Amendment compulsion. The Court might be encouraged to do so by the fact that
ordinarily a response to an identification demand would not be incriminating. Although under
Fifth Amendment case law it does not take much for a person to establish the requisite possibility
of incrimination,111 the usual identity check is not likely to provide “a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute.” 112 If an identity check produces any useful information at all it
is likely to be the name and other data about a hitherto unknown person against whom evidence
of a crime already exists. This is not the kind of testimonial incrimination against which the
Fifth Amendment protects.113 It of course is possible that in some exceptional case presenting an
identity card will constitute compelled self-incrimination. It is even more possible that the
police, having received compliance with their identification demands, will proceed to interrogate
outside of the “booking questions” or the simple command to produce an identity card. Neither
of these possibilities, however, makes the ordinary identity check incriminating as a general
matter. Importantly, because this is a case-specific question, no blanket injunction against a
national identity system on Fifth Amendment grounds could succeed.
Finally, even where an identification request nevertheless did appear to implicate the
Fifth Amendment, the recent decision in Chavez v. Martinez calls into question whether a Fifth
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Amendment violation would occur if the suspect’s responses were never introduced at trial.114 If
the required production of identification resulted in compelled testimonial incrimination, under
Chavez, unless and until the statements or information (or evidence derived therefrom) were used
at trial there would be no constitutional claim. This would raise questions about what evidence
was “the fruit of the poisonous” identification; that is, what causal connection need be shown
between the compelled self-identification and the trial evidence, and to what degree doctrines
like independent source and inevitable discovery would come into play.115 It is almost certain
that identity could be independently proved at trial and that associated data could be shown
likely to be inevitably discovered.116
In summary, identification checks would involve compelled testimonial communication.
Courts would thus have to decide whether the disclosure of personal data would nevertheless fall
outside the Fifth Amendment’s coverage under a doctrine like the “booking question” exception
to Miranda. Moreover, the ordinary identity check would rarely reveal incriminating
information, and even more rarely directly lead to tainted, and thus suppressible, courtroom
evidence. As a general matter, the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, therefore,
appears to present no insuperable barrier to required identity checks.
C. Arrests and Citations
All the reasons permitting law enforcement personnel to demand identification from
those stopped for investigation, and one more, apply to persons being arrested or given a traffic
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citation. These people have already been seized on an allegation of probable cause,117 so a
demand for identification imposes no additional restraint. Identification is even more necessary
for the processing of the arrest or traffic citation than for an investigative stop.118. An arrest will
usually lead to an arraignment on a criminal charge, and courts will often refuse to arraign an
individual whose identity is unknown.119 Before an arrestee is released on bail it is important to
know whether or not she is wanted for other offenses. A traffic citation also requires some
assurance that the person cited will respond or face the consequences
The Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Whren that the officers’ motivation for a traffic stop is
irrelevant to its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment; in other words, a driver cannot
object to a stop on the ground that it was a “pretext” for the officers to perform one of the many
investigation measures attendant on a traffic stop120 Because identification verification is always
part of a traffic law enforcement,121 police officers could, consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, pull drivers over to check that identification so long as they had first observed a traffic
violation. They would simply have to follow the driver until she committed the moving violation
that almost all drivers eventually do.122 None of the restraints on police discretion to target
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individuals on the basis of race or other appearance-based factors that the Supreme Court has
imposed with checkpoints apply in this context.123 The history of traffic enforcement against
minority motorists proves that law enforcement officers are perfectly willing to take advantage
of this opportunity.124
Traffic stops therefore present a powerful and dangerous tool for any national identity
system. Powerful because with enough law enforcement desire and effort, virtually any driver
could be made to stop and present an identity card; dangerous because of the unlimited official
discretion this practice allows. In the context of a national identity system, Whren opened more
of a Pandora’s Box than the Court knew. For this reason, statutory restraint on the use of traffic
stops as a means of identity checking should be considered as part of any national identity
scheme, though it must be acknowledged that such limitations would be difficult to define and
enforce.125 There are, of course, legitimate reasons to stop people for traffic violations. How

turning, to the times of day and weather conditions that require drivers to turn on their lights.”) are not even clearly
defined, giving officers the discretion to stop drivers who are operating vehicles in ways and under conditions that
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must carry, how loud an exhaust system may be, and even how deep the tread on a car's tires must be. The upshot of
all this regulation is that even the most cautious driver would find it virtually impossible to drive for even a short
distance without violating some traffic law. A police officer willing to follow any driver for a few blocks would
therefore always have probable cause to make a stop under Whren.”). See also, David A. Harris, “”Driving While
Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. OF CRIM. L. &
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violations . . . . .”) David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car at Any
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could police be dissuaded from doing so for the “wrong” reasons? It would be possible, for
example, to bar identity card demands during traffic stops for certain minor infractions. This
would result in some missed connections to valuable data, but it might be necessary in order to
discourage stops made for the primary purpose of identity checks. Official inducement to stop
vehicles for minor offenses in order to demand national identity cards is one major disadvantage
of an identity system.
D. Checkpoints
Checkpoints entail the stopping all persons or vehicles (or a pre-designated subset)
passing a particular location. They are a potentially important method of identity determination
for any national identity system, both because they could reach large numbers of people and
because they could be placed at or around sensitive locations. From an efficiency standpoint
they do not rest on the voluntary compliance of consensual encounters; nor do they depend upon
the reasonable suspicion of illegal behavior required for investigative stops. Checkpoints, in
short, are both compulsory and total in their potential coverage. Roadblock-type checkpoints
have already been employed for immigration enforcement, sobriety checking, drug interdiction,
and other national security and law enforcement objectives, and there is therefore a fairly
substantial body of case law on their legality under the Fourth Amendment. If a national identity
system did employ checkpoints, they would likely be applied to pedestrians as well, a use not yet
addressed by the Supreme Court.
1. Program Purpose
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Forcing people, in vehicles or on foot, to stop at checkpoints constitutes a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.126 The question then becomes under what circumstances such
suspicionless seizures are reasonable. In answering that question the Supreme Court has
distinguished between checkpoints whose primary purpose is to “detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing” and those that serve some “special need” other than the general interest in
crime control.127 The case creating this distinction, Edmond v. City of Indianapolis, held that a
checkpoint whose primary purpose was to apprehend persons carrying illegal drugs fell in the
former category.128 Any checkpoint whose primary purpose is to “advance the general interest in
crime control” violates the Fourth Amendment’s ban on seizing people without some
individualized indication of criminality and is per se unreasonable.129 On the other hand,
checkpoints “aimed primarily at purposes beyond the general interest in crime control”130 can be
permissible under the Fourth Amendment and are evaluated for reasonableness on the basis of a
three-pronged test discussed below.131 Using this test, the Supreme Court has upheld
immigration and sobriety checkpoints, and in dicta has indicated approval of roadblock-type
stops for highway license and registration checks,132 at government buildings or airports,133 or to
“thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way
of a particular route.”134
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Whether national identity system checkpoints would have as their primary purpose the
“detect[ion of] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” would depend, of course, on the
origins and contours of the program, but it seems unlikely that general crime detection would be
the primary purpose of such a system. Given the deep-seated national reluctanceto adopt a
national identity card, it would probably not be put into use unless there was a substantial threat
to national security, possibly in the form of more terrorist attacks. If so, the purpose would be
the prevention of further attacks. While such attacks would obviously be serious crimes, the fact
that the harm is also the subject of the criminal law would not necessarily keep these checkpoints
from serving a predominantly “non-criminal” purpose. The immigration checkpoints in
Martinez-Fuerte and the drunk driving roadblocks in Sitz sought to prevent harms (the presence
of undocumented aliens and inebriated drivers) that are also the object of criminal penalties.135
On the other hand, it could be argued that “terrorism” encompasses a variety of crimes,
and indeed is just crime with a particular motivation and/or target.136 Anti-terrorism checkpoints
would stretch the rationale of “special needs”/“non-criminal purpose” searches to its limit, if not
beyond. It is likely, however, that courts would find anti-terrorism checkpoints to be
distinguishable from general crime fighting, particularly in the face of the enormous public
pressures that would probably lie behind their creation.137 Lower courts that have considered the
permissibility of checkpoints on open military bases in the wake of Edmond have distinguished
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national security protection from society’s general interest in crime control, and have upheld the
practice.138
Congress could virtually insulate identity checkpoints from an Edmond challenge by
making immigration enforcement a major, if not primary, purpose. Emphasizing the importance
of border control, the prevalence of illegal alien presence in the U.S., and the difficulty of
interdicting those from Mexico, the Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte upheld a challenge to
vehicle roadblocks, each located approximately 65 miles from the Mexican border, in California
and Texas.139 The Edmond Court was careful to distinguish and preserve Martinez-Fuerte,
invoking again the special need to police the border.140 Checkpoints under a national identity
system would likely be distributed around the country and not necessarily be located within a
short drive of an international border as in Martinez-Fuerte.141 They would, in all likelihood, be
designed to identify not only illegal border crossers from Mexico but any noncitizens unlawfully
present in the U.S.142 A broader-gauged immigration focus would not, however, convert their
purpose to one of general law enforcement. In short, checkpoints whose principal purpose is the
identification and apprehension of noncitizens illegally present in the U.S. would certainly fall
outside of Edmond’s limited ban on suspicionless checkpoint seizures.
2. Reasonableness Determination
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For checkpoints whose primary purpose is not general law enforcement, the Supreme
Court determines reasonableness (and thus compliance with the Fourth Amendment) using a
three-pronged balancing test. The Court balances 1) the government’s interest in preventing the
relevant harm, 2) the extent to which the checkpoint system can be said to advance that interest,
and 3) the degree of intrusion on those persons who are stopped.143 The following subsections
discuss how this balance might apply to checkpoints employed in a national identity system.
a. Interest in Prevention
In assessing the degree of the problem it addressed, much would turn on the
circumstances behind national identity checkpoints and the aims they were designed to achieve.
It is hard to imagine, for example, that prevention of identity theft or election fraud, or the need
to assure that government benefits are delivered correctly, would count as substantial
government interests for widespread identity checkpoints. On the other hand, as indicated above,
a national identity system directed at a real and present danger of terrorist attacks or the illegal
presence of millions of noncitizens would almost certainly suffice. In Sitz the Court measured
the magnitude of the drunk driving problem by its annual death and personal injury toll and
amount of property damage.144 In the period after September 11th there would have been no
question about the scope and seriousness of the threat of domestic attack. The absence of
additional attacks thus far would probably not lower significantly the governmental interest,
though, particularly in light of the subsequent apprehension and conviction of several people for
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supporting or planning terrorist activity, as well as the elevated threat levels during the past two
years.145
As for immigration enforcement, what the Court said in 1976 Martinez-Fuerte is still
true: despite (or perhaps because of) the national policy to limit immigration, “large numbers of
aliens seek illegally to enter or to remain in the U.S.” 146 What is different now is that a much
smaller percentage of undocumented migrants than Martinez-Fuerte’s estimate of 85% is from
Mexico.147 Also, comparatively more undocumented migrants are now likely to be people who
overstayed their visas than people who entered the country surreptitiously.148 These people can
be anywhere in the country, pointing toward a greater necessity of enforcement activity in the
nation’s interior.
Unlawful alien presence is not an unmitigated harm, and the costs and benefits are
subject to vigorous debate.149 The undocumented population was assumed to be a serious
national problem in Martinez-Fuerte, however, and Congress would be entitled to find it to be so
if it created an immigration-focused national identity system.150 Moreover, to the extent that a
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terrorism threat comes from persons who are not U.S. citizens, especially those here without
permission, the governmental interests in preventing terrorist attack and illegal migration
reinforce each other.151 All of this suggests that the nature of the immigration problem may have
changed in the twenty-five years since Martinez-Fuerte, but its severity has not diminished and
may actually have increased.
b. Effectiveness
The second factor in the balance, the extent to which checkpoints advance the identified
interest, also depends on the problem or problems the checkpoints are designed to address. Let us
assume that these are prevention of terrorist attack and mitigation of illegal alien presence, or
some combination of the two. Checkpoint effectiveness can be measured in several different
ways: 1) the absolute number of suspects apprehended, 2) the rate of apprehensions (the number
of suspects divided by the number of individuals stopped); or 3) relative effectiveness compared
to other methods of prevention and enforcement. The Supreme Court has considered all three
outcomes in evaluating checkpoints, though not in any systematic way. The following
discussion applies these measures to hypothetical immigration and anti-terrorism identification
checkpoints.
As noted above, the country and the Court already have substantial experience with
immigration checkpoints in the form of roadblocks on major highways leading from the border.
The San Clemente checkpoint, located 66 miles north of the Mexican border on Interstate 5, the

long-standing debate. See e.g. Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMM. L.J. 339 (2002);
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principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, resulted in the apprehension of 17, 000
undocumented aliens in 1973.152 In fiscal year 2000, the San Clemente and Temecula
checkpoints in California produced slightly less than 10,000 arrests.153 In absolute terms, then,
highway checkpoints can be quite effective, at least when they straddle a well-traveled Interstate
in the vicinity of the border.
Of greater concern, however, is that the San Clemente checkpoint relied on referring
some motorists for a “secondary inspection” of three to five minutes, at which they would be
questioned about their citizenship or immigration status. These referrals, the Court assumed,
“are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry.”154 It is hard to see how secondary
referrals would work outside of the factual context of the Mexican border. Could other ethnic
groups be pulled aside for secondary inspection on the basis of their “apparent [fill in] ancestry”?
Putting aside the indignity of this of ethnic targeting,155 it is wildly inefficient. Under a national
identity system, however, presumably, every person would have to present a national identity
card to verify lawful presence in the U.S. Longer detention and more thorough questioning
would be necessary only for those who lacked proof of citizenship or lawful presence. This form
of “secondary” inspection eliminates the discretionary and profiling aspects of past
checkpoints.156 It does, to some degree however, correspondingly increase the inconvenience
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for everyone.157 Moreover, the discretionary aspects of checkpoint placement would,
presumably, remain, raising the possibility of placement in ethnically selected target areas.158
Measuring as it does rate of success, the ratio between the number of persons stopped
and the number apprehended is certainly an important factor in the reasonableness balance.159
Existing checkpoints impact an enormous number of vehicles and the success rate is relatively
low. In Martinez-Fuerte the Court found that .12% (or 12 of every 10,000) vehicles contained
deportable aliens. (In Sitz it approved a 1.6% success rate for sobriety checkpoints.160) While the
Court has upheld immigration enforcement roadblocks with a miniscule rate of success, more
general use of checkpoints would probably test even those numerical limits. On the other hand,
the Court in Sitz explicitly cautioned the judiciary against “a searching examination” of
checkpoint effectiveness.161
The success rate of a national identity system designed to discover undocumented
migrants is integrally tied to the third method of assessing effectiveness: relative effectiveness
compared to other methods of prevention and enforcement. In other words, are checkpoints
effective and necessary compared to available alternatives? The Court accepted roadblocks on
major highways leading from the border in Martinez-Fuerte partly because “the flow of illegal
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aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border” itself.162

If roadblocks were more

widespread they would probably catch additional undocumented aliens, particularly if they were
set up at other restricted access transportation routes or nodes. It is likely, however, that their
success rate would be even less than border region checkpoints because of the lower
concentration of undocumented aliens away from border areas. In addition, if checkpoints were
used with pedestrian traffic, ways to circumvent them would probably be available. The
checkpoints could be avoided unless they were mobile enough that the undocumented migrants
were taken by surprise or the checkpoints were situated so that there was no way around them. If
these speculations are correct, the more widespread checkpoints became, and the more they were
used against pedestrians, the lower their success rate is likely to be, though the total numbers of
apprehended aliens would go up.
With relative effectiveness, too, the Court urges deference to governmental preferences.
“[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among . . . reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a
responsibility for, limited public resources . . . .”163 Moreover, parties objecting to checkpoints
have the burden of proving that “the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints
could be met without reliance on routine checkpoint stops.”164
Despite the passage of numerous immigration law amendments designed to discourage
illegal entry and presence since 1976, including employer sanctions, expedited removal, new
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inadmissibility grounds, restrictions on public benefits, and enhanced border enforcement, 165 the
continued presence of millions of undocumented migrants makes it hard to imagine that a court
would find checkpoints relatively unnecessary.166 This is true even though checkpoints are no
panacea for illegal immigration. They are as likely to drive the undocumented further
underground – off thoroughfares and locations where checkpoints may be placed -- as to greatly
increase apprehensions. On the other hand, they may have some deterrent effect, by adding one
more burden to illegal presence in the U.S.167 In sum, an expanded use of checkpoints in
conjunction with a national identity card to enforce the immigration laws would seem to pass the
“effectiveness” threshold of the current Fourth Amendment balancing test.
To the extent that checkpoints would be employed to identify potential “terrorists” other
than undocumented aliens, the various measures of efficacy come out differently. Presumably,
checkpoints would be used either to catch individuals already identified as terrorism suspects or
to single out previously unknown persons who met some kind of “terrorist” profile.168 The
closest current analogy to the latter method is the CAPPS system used to screen airline
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passengers.169 What effects would flow if checkpoints similar to those used at airports were
installed in other public spaces?
Preventing terrorism is certainly a powerful national goal,170 but it seems likely that the
absolute number of suspects apprehended through extensive identification checkpoints would be
very small and the success rate would be miniscule.171 To begin with, the number of terrorism
suspects seems to be tiny, and the group of those who are not also in the U.S. illegally is even
smaller. Moreover, given what a crude instrument terrorist “profiling” is, the likelihood of
mistaken “hits” is substantial. Indeed, though statistics are not available, anecdotal reports
suggest that false positives – the singling out of innocent travelers -- occur fairly regularly under
the present version of CAPPS172 and are a concern in the design of CAPPS II.173 In short, the
rate of success would be relatively low and the rate of error relatively high.
In theory at least, the more information available to terrorist profiling software like
CAPPS, the greater the chances for accurate prediction. This produces the paradox that the more
intrusive the data collection and search, the greater its effectiveness is likely to be.174 Thus, from
the point of view of efficacy, tying a national identity card to as many databases as possible is a
good thing. Obviously, however, this encourages the collection and storage of more and more
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a profiling program’s effect in deterring attacks adds to the measure of its usefulness. Id. at n. 63. On profiling’s
effectiveness in general, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
(2002).
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See TAN infra.
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See Wald, supra note 46 (“The goal of CAPPS II, the department says, is to ‘significantly reduce the number of
passengers who are misidentified as potential threats to passenger of airline security . . . .’”).
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Hence the controversy over the number and kinds of data sources that CAPPS II will tap into and the use that will
be made of them. See Wald, supra note 46 (reporting a reduction in both the scope of information collected on air
travelers and on the use of credit and medical records).
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personal data and the linking of identity cards to greater numbers of databases, leading to a
greater potential impact on privacy.
With respect to the usefulness of other alternatives, much depends on the circumstances
that would prompt widespread use of identification checkpoints. Since September 11th the
federal government has enacted and assumed a wide range of powers to protect domestic
security. The best known is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,175 but there are a host of others,
including the creation of special military tribunals and the indefinite detention of “unlawful
combatants.”176 It is hard to know just how effective they have been, both because the
government releases scant information about its anti-terrorism activities,177 and because no one
really knows the extent of the threat. In light of the deference given by the Court to the political
choice of crime prevention methods, and the additional deference accorded the government in
protecting national security in and preventing terrorism,178 if checkpoints were deployed in the
wake of another domestic attack it seems highly unlikely the judiciary would find other
alternatives to be so effective as to render checkpoints constitutionally unnecessary.
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United and Strengthening American By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
176
See e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN (2002) (passim) (summarizing steps taken to identify and
apprehend terrorists within the U.S.); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, 96
A.J. INT’L L 237, 238-43 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, Terrorism and the Citizenry’s Safety, 17 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4,
4-5 (2002); Padilla
177
Amy Goldstein, Fierce Fight Over Secrecy, Scope of Law, WASH. POST at A1 (September 8, 2003) (Patriot Act
bans disclosures about its use, and there is little information publicly available about its effectiveness.)
178
See e.g.,Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001)(referring to the “heightened deference to the judgments of
the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”); Center for National Security Studies, v. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, 331 F. 3d 918, *27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding Dept. of Justice refusal to release the names of
persons detained in the wake of September 11 attacks and granting deference to governmental assessment of impact
on national security) (“American faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond
the capacity of the judiciary to explore.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, [publication] [page] (“Times of
heightened risk to the physical safety of their citizens inevitably cause democracies to recalibrate their institutions
and processes, and to re-interpret existing legal norms, with greater emphasis on security, and less on individual
liberty, than in “normal” times.) [page 1] (noting that “[i]n terms of actually defining first-order claims of rights,
American courts show great reticence to engage the permissible scope of liberties in direct, first-order terms” but
rarely endorse the position that the executive can make these deviations unilaterally.). [pages 7,5]
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c. Degree of Intrusion
The third factor in the Supreme Court’s assessment of roadblocks has been the degree of
intrusion experienced by stopped motorists. The Court speaks in terms of “objective“ and
“subjective” intrusions, with “objective” referring to physical interference with movement and
“subjective” referring to concern or fright caused to those stopped by the roadblock.179 In the
cases involving immigration and sobriety checkpoints, the Court found neither form of intrusion
particularly weighty.
The “objective” intrusion obviously depends on how a checkpoint is operated.
Hypothetical checkpoints under a national identity system would most likely involve stopping
each motorist or pedestrian, a demand for presentation of her identity card, and a “swipe” of the
card through a reader linked with computerized records.180 The individual effectively would be
detained both while this occurred as well as pending the electronic reply from the database. If
this sequence of events took no longer than an ordinary credit card authorization, it is doubtful
the Court would find the objective intrusion to differ significantly from that of immigration or
sobriety checkpoints, which the Court has characterized as “quite limited”181 and “slight.”182 A
“positive” response to the identity check, in the form of an outstanding warrant, an indication of
unlawful presence in the U.S., or some other adequate ground, can justify further detention, but
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Sitz, supra note 126, at 451-53; Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 558-59.
See TAN infra.
181
Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 557-58 (“The stop does intrude to a limited extent on motorists’ right to ‘free
passage without interruption, and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which all that is required of the vehicle’s occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the U.S.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted)
182
Sitz, supra note 126, at 451).
180
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that additional seizure must have its own independent basis.183 In fact, the use of terrorist
profiling raises separate Fourth Amendment issues of how much indication of “terrorist”
potential, as revealed at the identification checkpoint, would be necessary to justify taking
measures against a person, be it delayed or denied air travel, additional questioning or search, or
even arrest. 184
Even for stops that do not result in a “hit”, circumstances could easily cause people to be
detained or delayed to an extent that would weigh heavily against the practice. The average
delay occasioned by the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz was approximately 25 seconds,185 but
checkpoints requiring an individual to remove an identity card from her pocket or purse, to have
it read, and then to await clearance would probably take considerably longer. This would be
particularly true if the database scan took some length of time. Moreover, anyone who has
passed through airport security since September 11 knows that checkpoints can produce long
waiting lines, interfering significantly with free passage. Any of these entirely likely
possibilities would significantly increase the objective intrusion and distinguish identity
checkpoints from those upheld by the Supreme Court so far.
The “subjective” intrusion, however, can be seen as greater than that of current
immigration and sobriety checkpoints. In one way an identification checkpoint would be less
intimidating, because the checking would be limited to asking for a clearly designated piece of
identification. This is much less open-ended than looking for signs of intoxication, for example,

183

See TAN supra (secondary inspections); Whren v. U.S. . ; Cf. Bob Herbert, Jailing Immigrants,, N.Y. TIMES,
August 4, 2003, at A17 (describing the lawful, if unnecessary, detention of an alien after a computer check
following a traffic stop revealed his undocumented status).
184
Unless the law of search and arrest is going to be drastically revamped for terrorism suspects, the answers would
seem to be the usual measures of reasonable suspicion for investigative stops and probable cause for extended
detention, Dunaway, Sokolow search. Treating persons identified by a terrorism profile as unlawful combatants
would obviously negate some of these rules. Padilla
185
Id. at 448.
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at sobriety checkpoints. Fear of facing unknown questions on unknown topics would thereby be
reduced (assuming the officers stationed at the checkpoints restricted themselves to inspecting
identification). Although the Court has yet to consider pedestrian checkpoints, it seems unlikely
that it would find them more invasive than vehicle checkpoints as a general matter.186 In fact,
being forced to stop while on foot is in some ways less startling, and certainly less dangerous,
than approaching a roadblock by car.187
Being checked against a database is probably much more frightening, though, than the
checkpoint screening in Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz – even for an innocent person.188 The individual
has no way of knowing the contents of the database against which her identification is being run,
whether they are accurate or not, or what further impositions might be triggered by the
information. This uncertainty will turn every identification demand into cause for apprehension.
The purpose of the checkpoint matters less perhaps, in terms of “fear and surprise” than
whether the checkpoint is anticipated or not. Clearly there will more fright for even an innocent
traveler189 on encountering an unexpected demand to show identification than from a permanent
checkpoint akin to an airport security gate.190 The Court upheld, however, even temporary
checkpoints in Sitz. Nevertheless, this distinction is not meaningless, and checkpoints at
permanent, known locations do carry less of a subjective impact.
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At one point in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court adverted to the general principle of lesser expectation of privacy in
automobiles, ___ U.S. at _)__, but in context of the entire case the holding does not seem to turn on this factor.
187
On the other hand, the individual lacks the “protective shell” of her automobile.
188
Normally the Supreme Court only accounts for the reaction of a reasonable innocent person when determining
Fourth Amendment issues. See e.g. Florida v. Bosticle, 501 US at 438. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment
as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH, L. REV. 1229 (1983).
189
“Fear and surprise” relate to the “innocent” traveler, and not the trepidation produced in a person who fears
legitimate apprehension at the checkpoint. Sitz, supra note 126, at 451-52.
190
Sitz, supra note 126, at 463 (“A driver who discovers an unexpected checkpoint on a familiar local road will be
startled and distressed.”) (dissent of Stevens, J).
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Identification checkpoints, it may be argued, have an additional subjective effect, on a
grand scale: the psychic harm to a free people of having to “show your papers,” even if only at
certain designated locations.191 Not only would people forced to go through identity checkpoints
experience some degree of fear and surprise, but, knowing that this has become a permanent part
of the social fabric, their sense of liberty would be diminished.192 This feeling is not mitigated –
indeed, it may be enhanced – by the knowledge that other people are also being stopped and
asked for identification.193 Supreme Court majorities have not yet taken this subjective effect
into account, and may never, but it is certainly real even if it cannot be measured quantitatively.
Finally, the degree of intrusion must be considered in light of its frequency. In its
evaluation of the burden imposed by highway roadblocks, the Court has tended to describe and
consider the interference with one individual’s freedom. The more relevant fact in passing on
the reasonableness of a methodology that depends on stopping everyone, however, is the
collective burden.194 This imposition is a function of the intrusiveness of each individual stop
multiplied by the number of stops the system will entail. Looked at this way – admittedly, an
approach the majority of the Court has avoided – national identity card checkpoints carry a very
high cost. If a national identity system were to involve checkpoints at all, it is likely to require
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See e.g., Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F. 3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1999) (referring to checkpoints as “methods of
policing associated with totalitarian nations”) (Posner, J.).
192
Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human
Emotions, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 125, 131 (Spring 2002) (arguing for an “affective” definition of privacy that
takes into account peoples’ emotional reactions to surveillance).
193
Compare United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (“At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other
vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”), cited in Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 558.
194
The dissents in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz did pay some attention to the collective effects of highway roadblocks.
See Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 571 (“[C]heckpoints . . . detain thousands of motorists, a dragnet-like
procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citizens.) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sitz, supra note 126, at 472
(describing sobriety checkpoints as “a program that produces only a handful of arrests which would be more easily
obtained without resort to suspicionless seizures of hundreds of innocent citizens.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974) (contrasting the
“atomistic” view of the Fourth Amendment as a protection for isolated individuals with a conception of the Fourth
Amendment as a regulator of governmental conduct as a whole).
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lots of them. Otherwise, there is little point in having them; the few that did exist could be easily
circumvented. Thousands upon thousands of people would experience recurring delays and
some degree of distress in connection with the number of checkpoints likely in any national
identity system that used them.
d. Striking the Balance
Ubiquitous or even common demands for identity cards at stationary checkpoints would
change the nature of American life, and judicial determination of their constitutionality would be
a momentous event. All aspects of the three-part equation for assessment of their reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment depend in great part on the checkpoints’ purpose, how they are
structured, and the conditions that produced them. For that reason, it is impossible to given any
definitive answer in the abstract to the question of identity checkpoints’ constitutionality. The
fact-laden nature of the constitutional analysis, however, may run up against judicial reluctance
to second-guess political choice in times of national danger. This seems particularly true for
measures receiving both executive and legislative endorsement, 195 as would almost certainly be
the case for any comprehensive national identity system.
That said, some tentative conclusions about national identity system checkpoints are
possible. First, those aimed mainly at undocumented aliens would seem to have a good chance
of being upheld, principally because of the seriousness of the problem and the nation’s inability
to solve it despite decades of legislative and enforcement efforts. To the extent that potential
terrorists lurk among the undocumented, there is an additional justification. It seems likely, too,
that such identity checkpoints would have a reasonable rate of success, at least initially, as
measured by the Court’s undemanding standard. Unlike “terrorism” checkpoints, those that

195

Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 191.
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focused on immigration offenders would be less likely to have “false positive” results
(identifying U.S. citizens or lawful aliens as unlawful aliens), and would thereby keep unfounded
seizures resulting from identity checks to a minimum.196
This assumes that immigration checkpoints would require identity cards of all persons
passing through, not just those who “look” or “sound” foreign.197 The absence of police
discretion in who is exposed to an initial stop, particularly in contrast to roving patrols, 198 was an
important reason the Court upheld the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.199 In that case, though,
the Court did approve two other forms of official discretion: the choice of checkpoint locations200
and the referral for secondary inspection of persons of “apparent Mexican ancestry.”201 As noted
above, the use of a national identity card at immigration-focused checkpoints eliminates the
second type of discretion. Freedom to choose checkpoint location would remain, however, and
make possible troubling ethnic selection. In theory checkpoints designed to catch illegal
immigrants from Mexico, for example, could then be put in and around Mexican neighborhoods,
or those aimed at "terrorists" from the Middle East placed near Arab population centers.
Establishing, as they would, ethnic enclaves subject to border control, such decisions would be
profoundly unwise, even if legal.
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At first glance this, might seem like another example of what David Cole has described as a “sacrifice of the
liberties of noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry’s purported security.” David Cole Enemy Aliens, supra note
168, at 957 (2002). Even if imposed principally to apprehend undocumented aliens, though, checkpoints would
impact all people equally. In that sense they do not involve profiling or targeting of noncitizens. Immigration
focused checkpoints would be a law enforcement technique aimed at enforcing a body of law that affects only those
who could not prove lawful presence.
197
The absurdity of the latter category is illustrated by the fact that it would include two 2003 candidates for
California’s governorship.
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Compare Prouse, supra note 82 and Brignoni, supra note .
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Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 558-59 (insert quote)
200
Id. at 559.
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See note supra.
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Apart from immigration enforcement, checkpoints directed at catching potential terrorists
would, and should, mainly fail to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment. Huge numbers of
people would need to be stopped in the hopes of locating a very small collection of previously
identified individuals. The profiling of potential terrorists is at a very rudimentary stage, and its
coupling with identification checkpoints would in all likelihood yield a low rate of success and a
large number of wrongful investigative detentions. Despite the obvious importance of
preventing further domestic attacks, these likely results should stand in the way of finding such
general anti-terrorism identity card checkpoints to be reasonable seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. The outcome would probably be different, however, at especially sensitive
locations like airports, monuments, public buildings, or so-called national special security
events.202
E. Summary:
Existing Fourth Amendment law, then, would allow a fair amount of identity checking,
but forbid certain important techniques. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment bars official requests
for identification from any person at any time, as long as the person is not “seized” in the
process. This means that people could be required to present identification whenever they are
already stopped, as for example at registration procedures, and could be asked, but not
compelled, to present identification at other times under the so-called “consensual encounter”
doctrine. These two kinds of interactions alone would encompass a fairly large amount of
identity checking. In addition, when grounds to stop an individual already existed, as for
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When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service becomes the lead agency for
the design and implementation of the operational security plan. http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml. In 2002
these included the Winter Olympics, Super Bowl, World Economic Forum, and State of the Union Address.
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=30&content=55. See also, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, (2000)
(Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy diminished in certain places, including airports). check Lafave on the
law in this area.
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example, in the relatively unusual instances when there was probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminality, under Court precedent there is no Fourth Amendment objection to
official demands for the person’s identity card. In fact, the requirement that people carry an
identity card would be useful in the investigation of those stopped on suspicion and in the
processing of arrestees. There is a real danger, however, that the desire to run an identity check
would add one more temptation for police to perform traffic stops for ulterior purposes.
On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment does not allow random, suspicionless identity
checks. To that extent the specter of law enforcement officers asking for “your papers, please”
on an individual discretionary basis is barred by the constitution. Moreover, identity checkpoints
could not be established willy-nilly. They would, though, probably be constitutionally reasonable
for certain purposes in certain circumstances. If the Supreme Court follows its own roadblock
precedents in an intellectually honest way, the outcome will very much depend on the scope of
the problem checkpoints are designed to address, their effectiveness in doing so, and the degree
of interference with free movement they entail. On these factors, general checkpoints (outside of
sensitive locations) designed to “profile terrorists” should probably be found to be unreasonable.

IV. DATA GENERATION, COL
LECTION, AND RETENTI ON
At the same time the checking of identity cards taps into existing databases, it can also
generate new data by inputting the location and activity of the person whose identification token
is being read. For example, everyone is now required to present an identity card or other token
while checking in for a flight. In addition to indicating whether that person was a flight risk (or
perhaps an undocumented alien or wanted criminal), the same readable token could easily create
new data, such as the location, time and date the token was read, and even the flight and
itinerary. The database would now contain information about the person’s location and activities
52
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it did not previously have. This information could be used not only in subsequent identity
checks but also potentially for more general law enforcement or other purposes.203
Clearly, the compelled collection of this data would impact personal privacy and what
might be called the right of anonymity.204 People would know that the government has
information about their movements and activities, some of a private or even intimate nature.
They might change their behavior, not for fear of being caught doing something illegal, but
because they were reluctant to contribute to a permanent, government-held record of their
actions.205 The issue here, though, is not simply whether identity checks would compromise
individual privacy but whether they would do so in a way as to constitute a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment.206 This Part will evaluate the potential information generation, collection,
and storage aspects of a national identity system under current Fourth Amendment law, and
indicate how such a system might cause the law to change. As with seizures, the answers to
these questions depend on the circumstances, as well as the nature of the information itself.
A. Registration Procedures
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See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance (3d ed. 1999), Section B: TechnologicallyAssisted Physical Surveillance, Commentary to Standard 2-9.1(d) (vii) (p. 43) (“[T]he results of tracking operations
. . . can be preserved well after the surveillance ends, in theory indeterminately. This capability raises the specter of
extensive libraries that retain information on vast numbers of individuals in perpetuity.”)
204
The United States Supreme Court obliquely recognized this threat in Whalen v. Roe, 429, U.S. 589, 605
(1977) as it was upholding a statute requiring the reporting to a state agency, with patients’ names, of controlled
substances prescriptions. (“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts
of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files.”); See also, Christopher
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L. J. 213,
237-52 (2002) (advocating recognition of a right to anonymity).
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Id. at 251 (“People who know they are under government surveillance will act less spontaneously, more
deliberately, less individualistically, and more conventionally; conduct on the streets that is outside the mainstream,
susceptible to suspicious interpretation, or merely conspicuous – even if perfectly harmless – will diminish and
perhaps even be officially squelched.”).
206
There are arguments that data collection through identity checks would also compromise First Amendment
freedoms of speech and association and freedom of movement, but this Article will not address them. See ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance (3d ed. 1999), Section B: Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance, Standard 2.9-1 (“Law enforcement use of technologically-assisted physical surveillance can . . .
diminish . . .freedom of speech, association, and travel . . . .”). Cf., Slobogin, supra note 204, at 252-63.
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As mentioned above, in registration procedures an individual provides personal
information to a public or private entity, often, but not always, in person.207 There are a
surprising number of registration occasions in modern American life. If a national identity
number was used in these procedures, the data could end up in a database linked to that number
and be accessible for government use. This, in fact, is true already of a great deal of personal
information through its association with social security numbers.208 A centralized national
database would only fill in more of the picture of a person’s life.209
Deciding whether official access to such information is a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment, therefore requiring a warrant, probable cause, or some other evidentiary basis,
would put to the test a series of cases in which the Court has applied a concept of assumption of
the risk of surveillance. The Fourth Amendment aspects of government mandated data
generation were first raised in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, a case challenging various
aspects of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.210 The Act authorized the Secretary to require banks
to retain, with identifying information, their customers’ financial records, including copies of
checks over $100. These “record keeping” requirements, plaintiffs contended, constituted an
illegal search and seizure. The Court curtly dismissed this claim on the ground that neither the
Act nor the implementing regulations “require that any information contained in the records be
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See TAN infra (giving as examples registration for drivers’ licenses, medical services, schools, and flights, or
employment eligibility verification).
208
See TAN infra.
209
ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 192 (Nicholas Bethell & David Burg trans., Modern University
Library 1995 (1968) cited in United States v. Kincade, - F 3d -, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 20133 n. 35 (October 2,
2003).
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record…. A man’s answer to one
question on one form becomes a little thread…. There are hundreds of little threads radiating from every
man, millions of threads in all. If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the whole day would
look for a spider’s web.
210
416 U.S .21 (1974).
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disclosed to the Government; both the legislative history and the regulations make specific
reference to the fact that access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process.”211
However, when in United States v. Miller a depositor complained that the prosecution
obtained his bank records by defective process, the Supreme Court held that bank customers had
no expectation of privacy in their account records maintained by their banks.212 A depositor such
as Miller, the Court held, “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”213 It continued: “This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to
a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.”214 The Court has upheld the installation of pen registers, which
record telephone numbers dialed, for the same reason: the caller assumes the risk that the phone
company will divulge these numbers, and therefore has no expectation of privacy in that
information.215 This theory would encompass just about all information “voluntarily” conveyed
to third parties in course of one’s activities.216
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Id. at 52. The Court went on to hold that as to information the banks obtain from a customer “simply because the
Government wants it” the information is sufficiently described and limited, and sufficiently related to commerce
clause power as the withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge made by the banks. Id. at 67. It never reached
depositors’ Fourth Amendment claims in this regard, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 68.
212
425 U.S.435 (1976).
213
Id. at 443.
214
Id., citing cases involving government informants being sent, without judicial authorization, to converse with
suspects and report, record, or transmit the suspect’s statements.
215
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”)
216
Certain statutory protections now exist for personal financial records, Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§3401 (1978) (permitting depositors to challenge subpoenas for their financial records except where notifying them
would “seriously jeopardize the investigation”), and Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §3121
(1987) (court approval required for government access to telephone records). It is not clear whether the existence of
the statute would be found to create an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. California v.
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There are serious conceptual and practical problems with the approach, however.
Conceptually, when applied to information supplied under some assurance of confidentiality, as
with bank records, an individual cannot realistically be said to have assumed the risk of
divulgence; most people’s assumption would be the opposite. Furthermore, why should
disclosure to one person or entity be equated with disclosure to the entire world, and particularly
to law enforcement personnel?217 Privacy expectations do not need to be all or none, and are not
in real life.218 After all, the fact that one opens one’s home to social guests does not mean that
one has no expectation of privacy as against the police.219 Practically, the holdings above
present citizens with a Hobson’s choice of participating in many of the fundaments of modern
life or giving up the confidentiality of their personal information. These cases might be
described as adopting the “hermit” theory of privacy expectations: a person only has an
expectation of privacy in what she keeps totally to herself.220
Beyond these objections, the theory falls of its own weight when applied to information
required to be passed to the government, as would be the case if a national identity card was
needed for certain registrations and the information was then, by statutory mandate, transmitted
to the system’s computers. The risk of disclosure would be imposed, not assumed, and would not

Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (state right to privacy in garbage left at the curb does not create a reasonable
expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes).
217
See Brian J. Sen, Great Expectations of Privacy: A new Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MISS. L.
REV. 583, 604 (1989) (“Simply because individuals have, to a limited degree, exposed an activity to public view, the
Court should not conclude that they have completely relinquished all Fourth Amendment protection.”)
218
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged as much in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 521 U.S. 67, 78 (2001)
(“The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical hospital patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”).
219
Indeed, not only does the homeowner retain her expectation of privacy, but her social guest may share in it.
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
220
Smith v. Maryland, supra note 215, at 750 (“[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.”) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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be a risk at all but a certainty.221 These differences distinguish the bank records and telephone
pen register cases.222 The two requirements that information be linked to a national identity
number and transmitted to the government for inclusion in its identity system database make all
the difference, even if the information itself would have been generated anyway in the
registration transaction. In addition, many occasions for registration involve activities that are
central to a free and full life, like education, medical care, and travel.223 Together these factors
obviate the fictions of voluntary third-party disclosure and assumed risk, and should cause
governmentally mandated collection and transmission of personal data to be found to be a search
under the Fourth Amendment.224 Whether the Court would reach this conclusion is not so clearcut in light of its record.225
If it did conclude that such compelled data collection was a search, that finding would not
end the inquiry. The Court would then need to address the reasonableness of the practice. Given
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This would be analogous to Justice Marshall’s hypothetical of an official announcement that henceforth mail or
private phone conversations would be randomly monitored, forcing citizens to “assume the risk” of government
intrusion. Smith, supra note 215, at 750.
222
But official constraint on choice was not enough to save the homeowner who was compelled by ordinance to
leave his garbage at the curb from being held to have assumed the risk that “animals, scavengers, children, and
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what could be characterized as the non-criminal purpose of such data collection,226 the analysis
used for other administrative searches would probably be applied. As with regulatory seizures,
this methodology balances “the government’s need to search against the invasion the search
entails.”227 Using this approach the Court has upheld health and safety inspections of homes
without any indication of individual wrongdoing, as well as a host of other suspicionless “special
needs” searches.228
On the other hand, it has never upheld the kind of blanket invasion of personal privacy
that the transmission of registration information into national databases would involve. While it
is true that such personal information would be used to further important government interests,229
this practice would appear to lack many other attributes of the administrative searches the Court
has sustained. For example, as a novel expansion of data collection, it would not carry the “long
history of judicial and public acceptance” that home health and safety inspections have had.230
Even though amassing personal information in comprehensive databases might ultimately
increase their usefulness, the marginal utility is uncertain if not completely speculative. An
enormous amount of data about virtually every person in the United States would have to be
collected and retained in the hope that some of it might give some hint of terrorist or other illegal
activity. The absolute effectiveness of terrorist profiling using a wide array of personal data has
yet to be demonstrated.231 There can thus be no claim that no “other technique would achieve
acceptable results.”232
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With respect to the degree of intrusion, much would turn on how long the information
was retained, what parties had access to it, and the purposes for which it would be used. These
factors figured in the Court’s assessment in Whalen v. Roe of New York’s centralized filing
system for controlled substances prescriptions, identifiable by patient name.233 Challenged by
doctors and patients on right to privacy grounds,234 this mandatory reporting program was upheld
by a unanimous Court. The program contained limitations on who could access the data and
made unauthorized disclosure a crime; no instances of unauthorized use had occurred in the first
twenty months of the program’s operation.235 These and other features of the New York drug
prescription library in Whalen point the way for designing a mandatory data collection system
that could pass as a reasonable search. Limited disclosure is essential.236 Because a national
identity system’s more extensive database would potentially be useful in civil or criminal cases,
additional restrictions, such as barring the use of database contents in litigation in a manner akin
to a privilege, might also be advisable.237
In a national identity system, limiting retention of registration records would conflict
with compiling the fullest picture of a person’s movements and activities. Obviously, the longer
records were retained the more complete that picture, though older data is usually less
informative than more recent. Record retention has surfaced as an issue in the design of CAPPS

for patterns of activity that are based on observations from past terrorist attacks as well as estimates about how
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II. At first the Department of Transportation proposed to retain data about certain individuals for
up to 50 years. In response to a flood of negative comments, the Department (now of Homeland
Security) currently proposes to retain information about U.S. citizens and permanent resident
aliens only for a matter of days after completion of travel.238 The Court in Whalen noted with
approval that New York destroyed its stored prescription records after five years, and it seems
likely that the shorter the retention period the more reasonable a records database will appear.
In sum, although mandatory reporting to government databases of the kind of
“registration data” that is an incident of twenty-first century American life should be found to be
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, it might well pass as a reasonable one. The outcome of
the reasonableness balance would depend in part on the purpose of the data collection as well as
the its effectiveness in achieving that purpose. But even where the success rate was low, as it
undoubtedly would be in “terrorist” profiling, restrictions on use, retention, and disclosure might
well tip the balance toward Fourth Amendment acceptability, at least during its experimental
phase.239
Governmental collection of registration data would also withstand Fifth Amendment selfincrimination challenge, even if some of the information might provide a “link in the chain of
evidence used to prosecute.” 240 Suppose, for example, a flight school was obligated to transmit
personal data about its students, including the fact of enrollment, to a governmental database,
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and that this data helped trigger a terrorist profile or was used in a criminal prosecution.241 The
main answer to a Fifth Amendment objection is that the government did not “compel”
production of the information; the person voluntarily supplied it when she registered with the
school.242 As the Court said in Fisher v. United States, “the Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination, not the disclosure of private information.”243 “It follows that the
self-incrimination privilege is not available to a customer, patient, or client of a third party
[required] to produce its records relating to that person.”244 Most, if not all, database material
would probably come from third parties; if so, no Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights
would be affected.
Because a national identity system would probably not require an individual to report her
own whereabouts or private activities directly to a government database, the discussion of this
form of data collection will be fairly summary. One reason for its unlikelihood is that the
permissibility of a self-reporting scheme under the Fifth Amendment is much less clear-cut than
reporting by third parties. An analysis of the self-incrimination issue would necessitate a choice
between a line of cases barring self-reporting obligations which produce clearly incriminating
communications245 and those where the likelihood of self-incrimination is less and/or the
reporting is more directly linked to a noncriminal regulatory scheme.246 Significantly, among the
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latter category is California v. Byers, in which the Court narrowly upheld a “hit and run” statute
requiring any driver involved in an accident to stop and provide his or her name and address.247
The resolution of the conflict between these lines of authority would depend on the precise
contours of the self-reporting demanded by the national identity system, as well as any
restrictions on the information’s use.248 It is possible that self-reporting could be structured in a
way as to avoid offending the Fifth Amendment. Barring the information’s use in a criminal
prosecution would certainly suffice, and would not greatly interfere with employing the
information in profiling for further surveillance. As a practical matter, though, self-reporting
would surely be far less reliable and complete than mandated data reporting by third parties. For
those reasons alone a national identity system could not sensibly depend on individuals
providing information about their own activities. Avoidance of any substantial Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination problems suggests the same course.
B. Consensual Encounters, Terry Stops, Citations, and Arrests
In contrast, data generation and collection associated with consensual encounters, stops,
and arrests does not fall afoul of the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches, though
for slightly different reasons in each case.
1. Consensual Encounters
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The same consent that prevents certain encounters from being classified as seizures under
the Fourth Amendment should keep their attendant production of information from constituting
searches. Suppose, for example, a person pauses and presents her identity card in response to a
request for that card. Suppose, too, that data showing the card was checked at that particular
time and place is added to the government database while her identification is being “run”
against that database. The database would now contain additional information about this person:
that she was at place X at time Y and that she voluntarily presented her identity card. It might
very well also record the fact that her identity check showed nothing unusual.
For two related reasons, this does not amount to a search. First, to the extent she knew
the workings of the system, a fairly likely possibility if a national identity system were in place,
having voluntarily stopped and presented her identification card, she has consented to having this
information included. Second, even if she was unaware of its implications, here, unlike the
registration procedures above, she has truly assumed the risk of this data collection and storage.
The person who has viewed her card now knows her identity, and of course also knows the time
and place the card was read. That person is free to report, record, or transmit that information,
and the fact that this is done surreptitiously, or electronically, has no bearing, the Court has held,
on the individual’s expectation of privacy.249
2. Terry Stops
Investigative stops, of course, do not contain this element of consent. The question here
is whether the same reasonable suspicion that justifies stopping a person and demanding
identification in the first place also justifies recording and retaining that information with a date,
time, and location stamp. This data collection and retention clearly adds to the imposition of a
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Terry stop. Now instead of the “brief intrusion” described by the Court, the individual has a
“brief intrusion” plus an endless record, not only of having been in a particular place at a
particular time, but also perhaps of having generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Because Terry was decided by balancing the governmental need for investigative stops against
their degree of individual intrusion, this additional imposition upsets Terry’s balance.
It is a close question, but the Court would nevertheless probably permit this practice, for
several reasons. One is that the observations underlying this newly recorded data ordinarily are
of the person in a public place, a law enforcement action not usually subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation.250 Second, the individual is not being forced to provide any information
beyond her identification, an incident of a Terry stop the Court has already upheld.251 The
additional information transmitted to the database – time, place, and even the reason for the stop
and its outcome – is all created by the officer; in other words, there is no search involved in
discovering these facts. Third, access to such stored information may serve the purposes of
investigative stops in general: confirming or dispelling the suspicion of criminality. A person
who claims to be “lost” in the vicinity of high-value theft targets, for example, is less believable
if he was “lost” there before.
There is no question that retaining data from a stop adds to its intrusiveness when that
data is linked to a particular person.252 This is especially true when the investigative stop does
not lead to arrest; an individual could acquire a police “record” for activities that were not
criminal enough to produce an arrest, much less a conviction.253 Whether that extra weight on
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the Terry scale would cause the Court to bar this practice, or insist on a higher level of criminal
probability for its use, is much less clear.
3. Traffic Citations and Arrests
Recording and storing data associated with traffic citations and arrests is
unexceptionable. As with Terry stops, other than the identification supplied by the suspect, the
information would have been observed and recorded by the officer. Moreover, here there is
probable cause for detaining and processing the individual. It is not possible to adjudicate traffic
citations and arrests without collecting data about their circumstances. The widespread practice
of gathering and storing this data attests to its acceptance.254 Arrest records are now used for
charge, bail and sentencing decisions, and in connection with the grant of certain licenses.255
There is thus a demonstrated need for the collection and retention of arrest data, and no apparent
Fourth Amendment objection to doing so. This is true even though aggregation of arrest data in
one database, or several linked ones, is qualitatively different from the maintenance of discrete
public records in the originating jurisdictions.256
C. Checkpoints
Identification checkpoints present another opportunity for collecting, and then storing,
information about the location of a particular individual at a particular time. Ordinarily, official
surveillance of a person in public, even targeted surveillance, does not amount to a search under
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the Fourth Amendment.257 In United States v. Knotts the Supreme Court applied this principle to
the tracking of a beeper that government agents had installed in a can of chloroform, a chemical
used to manufacture methamphetamine.258 With the assistance of a monitoring device placed in
a helicopter, agents tracked the vehicle carrying the can to a particular cabin, and included this
discovery in a search warrant application for the cabin. Responding to defendant’s argument that
this was search, the Court stated, “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,” the Court
stated.259 It continued, “[t]he fact that the officers in this cased relied not only on visual
surveillance, but on the use of the beeper . . . does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed on them at
birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”260 In Knotts,
then, the Court placed official surveillance of public movement, and the use of technological aids
to do so, outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment. No longer could a person rely on her
wiles or the vagaries of human physical and mental abilities to preserve her public
“anonymity.”261 Knotts, it might be said, ended the “sporting chance” age of public surveillance
and moved us into the era of big game hunting.262
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Knotts thus poses a major obstacle to any claim that information garnered in a checkpoint
stop would be the fruit of an unconstitutional search. If the government can follow (or stop)
people traveling in public, presumably it can also record what it learns. With enough
checkpoints, though, it could virtually track everyone’s movements. Knotts himself raised the
specter of “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen,” eliciting this response from the Court:
“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”263 The
use of identification checkpoints to generate a database of individual activities would certainly
bring that day closer, but the constitutional outcome would very much depend on the nature and
extent of such public surveillance. It is possible to imagine degrees of checkpoint data collection
that would fall well within the Supreme Court’s tolerance level.
D. Summary
National identity cards could be the fulcrum for a massive exercise in government data
collection. At the least, the resulting databases would cause many people to experience a loss of
privacy and a fear of the use (or misuse) of their personal information. Whether such
governmental collection, use, and retention of personal data would constitute an unreasonable
search is far less certain. As reviewed above, under present law the state can view and record a
fair amount of publicly observable activity, and can collect data on police-citizen interactions
that are otherwise justifiable. These instances involve few real Fourth Amendment concerns.
Mandatory reporting of personal information raises the toughest Fourth Amendment issue
because, this section contends, it should be regarded as a governmental search. Nevertheless, it

technology in question “is not in general public use.” Id. This is probably not the case with tracking devices, and
certainly not the case for checkpoint surveillance and record keeping.
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is likely that some measure of collection of data that has already been generated in daily life
would be tolerated under the case law permitting non-criminal administrative searches.
Comprehensive restrictions, particularly on disclosure and use, as well as on the duration of
information retention, would help this practice pass constitutional muster. On the other hand,
before the United States came close to becoming a “total information society” one would hope
the Supreme Court call a halt to its previous acceptance of mandated reporting. Just when that
line would be crossed is impossible to predict. Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections
would not arise in governmental gathering of information given to third parties.

V. CONCLUSION
The United States may never have or use a national identity card. Since September 11,
however, the possibility has become real enough that it is not too soon to attempt to evaluate the
constitutionality under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the kinds of practices a national
identity system might employ. It would be pointless and unwise to design a system blatantly
conflicting with these provisions. Given the expense and effort entailed in creating any national
identity system, costs and benefits should be evaluated at an early stage of its consideration. To
the extent that the constitution would stand in the way of a particular national identity card uses,
the projected benefits will be correspondingly reduced, decreasing its overall desirability. In
addition, if there is going to be a national identity system, it is advisable to consider the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment issues in advance of its design so as to minimize civil liberties intrusions
and maximize the prospects for judicial acceptance.
This Article has attempted to indicate what those constitutional obstacles and issues
might be, as well as what practices present little or no problem. With respect to the Fourth
Amendment seizures that might be implicated in official demands for an identity token, a wide
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range of identification occasions would not present much constitutional difficulty. These include
demands for identification during registration procedures and during investigative and traffic
stops and arrests, and requests for identification during consensual encounters. There is one
outright prohibition on official insistence on presentation of an identity card, and two important
caveats. Suspicionless stops to check identity cards would be unreasonable seizures. One caveat
concerns the use of checkpoints for terrorist profiling. Unless extraordinary circumstances
develop, or there is a quantum leap in the effectiveness of this technique, checkpoint stops to link
people to a database in order to profile potential terrorists should be held to be unreasonable
seizures. On the other hand, checkpoints designed to identify unauthorized migrants or known
suspects seem likely to receive judicial acceptance. The second caveat about the design of a
national identity system is the danger it poses for drastically increasing pretextual traffic stops of
motorists: stops for genuine traffic violations undertaken not to enforce the law but for the
purpose of checking identification. This practice is lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but, in
the absence of a wholesale reinterpretation of the pretextual stop doctrine, legislation for a
national identity system should attempt to discourage it.
A review of the Fourth Amendment issues in government-mandated data collection,
retention and use shows that recording public encounters, including those in normal investigative
stops and arrests, as well as those at checkpoints, would be unlikely to raise serious objection.
Recording investigative stops would probably be upheld despite considerable grounds for finding
them to upset the carefully constructed balance sustaining the constitutionality of seizures based
upon reasonable suspicion. Government acquisition of personal data that was already supplied in
connection with some ordinary service poses the most serious Fourth Amendment issue. This
procedure should be treated as a search, but it may be a reasonable one, at least until it reaches
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some indefinable level of societal surveillance. Thus far the Supreme Court seems willing to
accept a certain amount of government database creation by way of gathering information
already in existence.
Where this leaves the prospects for a national identity system is hard to say, particularly
because a definitive judgment about its constitutionality can only come after its features are
defined, and even then only the litigation necessary to resolve many of the close questions
identified in this Article. Clearly, the Fourth Amendment stands in the way of the kind of total
surveillance and the anytime identification demands that would allow such a system to operate at
maximum efficiency. On the other hand, there is still a fair amount the government could do in
both areas that would withstand Fourth Amendment challenge. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment
presents no significant obstacle to the primary functions of a national identity system.
This review of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues should serve to demonstrate to
proponents of an identity card that there are both limits and dangers to its use. It should also
make clear to those who see a national identity system as an Orwellian nightmare that while the
constitution stands somewhat athwart its path, it does not make such a system impossible.
Whether the kind of national identity system that could operate lawfully is worth the financial,
administrative, and social costs, would ultimately be a policy, not a legal, judgment. Much of
the policy assessment, though, involves a balancing of the government’s need for a national
identity card, its effectiveness, and its imposition on privacy and free movement. To a large
degree, these are the same factors on which the constitutionality of a national identity system
turns. The legal analysis thus gives a useful window on the desirability as well as the
constitutionality of adopting a national identity card.
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